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The Rising None: Marsh, Galloway, and the 
End of Legislative Prayer 
NICHOLAS C. ROBERTS* 
INTRODUCTION 
You know that every session of Congress begins with a prayer by a paid 
pastor or paid minister whose salary has been paid by the taxpayer since 1777. 
So lest we forget, this is not a new idea, and despite the objections of some, 
they are in the minority and they are ignorant of the history of our country. So 
humbly, I’d like to thank you for letting me pray and if out of respect to God 
you’re open to bowing, I would love to pray. 
. . . . 
So again, just govern this entire meeting, help it to be pleasing and effective, 
and we ask all this in Jesus Christ’s name. Amen.1 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,2 which concerned a New York town’s practice 
of opening its public board meetings with brief prayers, the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the preceding prayer and others like it.3 The decision made 
it clear that very few, if any, legislative prayer practices will be held 
unconstitutional4 under the Establishment Clause.5 What remains unclear is how 
that ruling can possibly coexist with earlier Supreme Court pronouncements that 
the government must remain neutral in religious matters,6 and that the government 
cannot favor religion over nonreligion.7 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Executive Notes & Comments Editor, Indiana Law Journal; J.D. candidate, 2015, 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; M.A., 2009, Syracuse University S.I. Newhouse 
School of Public Communications; B.A., 2007, University of Southern California. I am 
deeply grateful to my fellow ILJ editors for their help with this Note, to Professor Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer for his guidance and advice, and to S.J. Velasquez for pointing me toward 
research on the Nones. I dedicate this to Katie Roberts, who was a constant source of love 
and support, and who listened to me talk about this subject at great length—and rarely 
complained. The views expressed in this Note are those of the author alone. 
 1. Complaint at ¶ 67, Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 
2010) (No. 6:08CV06088), 2008 WL 7318228 (quoting the opening prayer delivered by 
Pastor Vince de Paola at the October 16, 2007, meeting of the town board of Greece, New 
York), rev’d, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 3. Id. at 1828 (“The town of Greece does not violate the First Amendment by opening 
its meetings with prayer that comports with our tradition and does not coerce participation by 
nonadherents.”). 
 4. Id. at 1824 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or 
betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a 
prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
 6. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968). 
 7. Id. at 104 (“The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”). 
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Before Galloway, the Supreme Court directly addressed the topic of legislative 
prayer only once. In the landmark case of Marsh v. Chambers,8 the Court rejected a 
challenge to the Nebraska state legislature’s practice of beginning its sessions with 
prayers delivered by a chaplain—a Presbyterian minister employed by the State and 
paid out of public funds.9 The Court held that where the chaplain’s appointment did 
not “stem[] from an impermissible motive”10 and there was “no indication that the 
prayer opportunity ha[d] been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to 
disparage any other, faith or belief,” there was no Establishment Clause violation.11 
The Court based its decision primarily on the long history of legislative prayer in 
the United States.12 
The Supreme Court did not revisit the issue of legislative prayer for thirty years 
following Marsh. In the intervening years, lower courts struggled to apply its 
holding, with inconsistent results.13 Unresolved questions included whether Marsh 
required legislative prayers to be nonsectarian and what constituted an 
impermissible motive in selecting a prayer giver. Galloway answered some of 
Marsh’s questions, but raised others about the future of legislative prayer and about 
the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause in general.14 
This Note contends that the Supreme Court wrongly decided both Marsh and 
Galloway. The Justices in the Court’s conservative majority likely voted for the 
outcome they desired in Galloway, but even if the Justices had preferred a different 
result, external pressures on the Court ensured that they would not overrule 
Marsh.15 Although legislative prayer is safe for now, it will almost certainly be 
ruled unconstitutional eventually. Marsh and its progeny depend on the exclusion 
and marginalization of certain religious minorities, including polytheists and 
atheists.16 Any legislative prayer offered to a monotheistic God can neither respect 
nor accommodate the beliefs of such groups. Legislative prayer has survived this 
long because the American people have been willing to accept the practice.17 
However, the public’s acquiescence will not last forever, especially considering 
that the number of people who do not affiliate themselves with any particular religion 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 9. Id. at 784–85. 
 10. Id. at 793.  
 11. Id. at 794–95. 
 12. Id. at 792 (“In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has 
become part of the fabric of our society.”). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely clear from our 
Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists 
and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”). 
 17. See Voters Say We Can Pray in Public Meetings, FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY 
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2014/letuspray/final.pdf (finding that 73% of 
voters approved of legislative prayer). 
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(“the Nones”)18 is growing.19 
Before discussing the future of legislative prayer, it will be useful to review its 
past. Part I of this Note discusses Marsh, including its reasoning, its meaning, and 
its effects. Part II reviews the implementation and modification of Marsh by the 
circuit courts. Part III turns to Galloway, analyzing the decision and evaluating its 
future implications. Finally, Part IV applies the strategic model20 of judicial 
decision making to help explain legislative prayer’s past and future, explores the 
impact of the Nones, and proposes a few alternatives to legislative prayer, 
including nonreligious opening statements, moments of silence, and public forums. 
A survey of the cases from Marsh through Galloway demonstrates that 
legislative prayer’s continued existence threatens the religious liberty protected by 
the First Amendment.21 In the context of town board meetings such as those in 
Galloway, the danger is especially great. Unlike the meetings of Congress or state 
legislatures, town board meetings involve direct democracy. The government 
cannot subject its citizens to a state-sponsored religious practice as the cost of 
participation in government.22 
I. UNDERSTANDING MARSH AND ITS MEANING 
Marsh v. Chambers is a curious decision. After all, if the Establishment Clause 
and the separation of church and state23 mean anything, it seems (if only as a matter 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. The term “Nones” was coined by Professor Barry A. Kosmin of Trinity College. 
Wendy Thomas Russell, An Interview with the Guy Who Named the “Nones” (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://wendythomasrussell.com/nones/. The term is “a label for a diverse group of people who 
do not identify with any of the myriad of religious options in the American religious 
marketplace—the irreligious, the unreligious, the anti-religious, and the anti-clerical. Some 
believe in God; some do not. Some may participate occasionally in religious rituals; others 
never will.” BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR WITH RYAN CRAGUN & JUHEM 
NAVARRO-RIVERA, AMERICAN NONES: THE PROFILE OF THE NO RELIGION POPULATION i (2009), 
available at http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/NONES_08.pdf. 
 19. See, e.g., Yasmin Anwar, Americans and Religion Increasingly Parting Ways, New 
Survey Shows, UC BERKELEY NEWS CENTER (Mar. 12, 2013), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu
/2013/03/12/non-believers/. 
 20. See generally Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on 
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001). 
 21. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) (“But the 
religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively 
sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater 
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (finding that the Establishment Clause 
“guarantee[s] religious liberty and equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a 
non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism’” (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 
(1985))), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 22. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (“It is a tenet of the First Amendment 
that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the 
price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.”). 
 23. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“In the words of 
[Thomas] Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
‘a wall of separation between church and State.’” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 
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of common sense) that a legislature should not pray to God and seek divine 
guidance in the performance of its legislative duties. 
By grounding its decision in a predominantly historical analysis, the Supreme Court 
ignored and rejected its own Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including the test 
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman24 just a dozen years earlier. To pass constitutional 
muster under the Lemon test, the challenged statute or policy must have a secular 
legislative purpose, its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it 
“must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”25 In order to 
uphold Nebraska’s practice as constitutional, the Marsh Court needed to ignore 
Lemon. As Justice Brennan observed in dissent, “[I]f any group of law students were 
asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would 
nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”26 
Nor was there any other test the Court could have applied from its previous 
Establishment Clause cases to uphold Nebraska’s legislative prayer policy. Even 
before Lemon, the Court had declared a rule that the government must remain 
neutral in religious matters. This “neutrality principle” was most clearly articulated 
in Epperson v. Arkansas: 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in 
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile 
to any religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, 
foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or 
even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion.27 
The Marsh Court disregarded the neutrality principle by upholding the plainly 
religious practice of legislative prayer,28 but it did so without overruling Epperson, 
Lemon, or any of its other Establishment Clause cases. The Court thus created an 
exception to the Establishment Clause, “rather than reshaping Establishment Clause 
doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.”29 The obvious question is: Why? One 
possibility is that the Court responded strategically to external institutional 
pressures.30 In a post-Marsh case involving the constitutionality of a Ten 
Commandments display, Justice Scalia provided an explanation for the Court’s 
inconsistent approach to religious neutrality: 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 145, 164 (1878))). 
 24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 25. Id. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 27. 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968). 
 28. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the ‘purpose’ of 
legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than secular seems to me to be 
self-evident. ‘To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws[]’ 
is nothing but a religious act.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting the opinion of 
the Court at 792)). 
 29. Id. at 796. 
 30. For a more detailed discussion of how external pressures influence judicial decision 
making, see infra Part IV. 
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What, then, could be the genuine “good reason” for occasionally 
ignoring the neutrality principle? I suggest it is the instinct for 
self-preservation, and the recognition that the Court, which “has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse,” cannot go too far down 
the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact 
and current practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of 
the people to accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, 
in preference to the contrary interpretation of the democratically elected 
branches.31 
In its attempt to preserve itself, the Marsh Court disregarded the neutrality 
principle and its own jurisprudence, relying on a version of history that was 
incomplete at best and distorted at worst.32 The resulting decision created more 
questions than it answered and offered little help to courts in future legislative 
prayer cases.33 
A. Oversimplified History 
The Marsh Court’s unusual reliance on historical tradition rather than judicial 
precedent has been criticized for two separate reasons. First, scholars such as 
Professor Michael W. McConnell have argued that the Court’s history-focused 
approach does not help us interpret the meaning of the Constitution.34 Second, there 
is evidence that the Court’s account of history was not entirely accurate.35 
Turning to the first objection, the Court’s use of historical analysis is troubling 
because the majority uses history to avoid engaging in a meaningful discussion of 
Establishment Clause principles. “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years,” Chief Justice Burger wrote, “there can be no doubt 
that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the 
fabric of our society.”36 By glossing over any arguments to the contrary, the Court 
produced an opinion that is “simply insufficient.”37 While the Court paid lip service 
to the idea that “historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of 
constitutional guarantees,”38 it failed to provide any convincing reason that would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 892–93 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 32. See infra Part I.A. 
 33. See infra Parts I.B and II. 
 34. Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 
362–63 (1988) (“So far as one can tell from the Court’s opinion, there is simply an exception 
from the establishment clause for legislative chaplains . . . . The decision casts no light on 
the meaning of the constitutional provision. Indeed, it can be said that Marsh v. Chambers 
does not interpret the Constitution at all.”). 
 35. Justice Brennan made this point in his dissenting opinion: “[I]n general, the history of 
legislative prayer has been far more eventful—and divisive—than a hasty reading of the Court’s 
opinion might indicate.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 792. 
 37. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 841 (1993). 
 38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790. 
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justify violating the principle of religious neutrality. The Court’s conclusory 
assertions failed to satisfy scholars such as McConnell, who argued that: 
Marsh v. Chambers represents original intent subverting the principle 
of the rule of law. Unless we can articulate some principle that explains 
why legislative chaplains might not violate the establishment clause, 
and demonstrate that that principle continues to be applicable today, we 
cannot uphold a practice that so clearly violates fundamental principles 
we recognize under the clause.39 
The Court compounded its failure to provide a principled basis for its decision 
by oversimplifying the historical narrative it relied upon. The majority opinion 
noted that the First Congress in 1789 adopted a policy of hiring chaplains to open 
sessions of both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate.40 Congress 
approved the Bill of Rights just three days after authorizing the appointment of paid 
chaplains, and the Court accepted this as proof that “the men who wrote the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening 
prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with 
prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”41 
Professor Christopher C. Lund reviewed the history of the congressional 
chaplaincies and concluded that this history was both more contentious and more 
complicated than the Marsh opinion would suggest.42 Consider Lund’s response to 
the Court’s assertion that legislative prayer “is simply a tolerable acknowledgment 
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country”43: 
This is simply wrong, and almost risibly so. It perpetuates the very false 
illusion that the chaplaincies were altogether innocuous and universally 
supported; it ignores all of the ways in which the chaplaincies were 
sometimes controversial and divisive. In the end, the Court’s desire to 
portray the chaplaincies as benign ends up distorting its historical 
analysis. Marsh wanted the chaplaincies to seem sterile, but this 
required disinfecting parts of the relevant history.44 
One of the parts that “required disinfecting” was the widespread prejudice against 
American Catholics in the nineteenth century.45 The 1832 election of Charles 
Constantine Pise, the first Catholic Senate chaplain,46 led to calls for the abolition 
of the chaplaincies.47 Pise left office after less than a year,48 and neither the House 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. McConnell, supra note 34, at 362 (emphasis in original). 
 40. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787–88. 
 41. Id. at 788. 
 42. See generally Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009). 
 43. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
 44. Lund, supra note 42, at 1213. 
 45. See id. at 1187–93. 
 46. Id. at 1187. 
 47. Id. at 1189. 
 48. Id. at 1190. 
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nor the Senate elected another Catholic chaplain until the year 2000.49 According to 
Lund, the fierce opposition to Catholic chaplains contradicts the Marsh Court’s 
assertion that legislative prayer does not place the government’s seal of approval on 
the prayer giver’s religious viewpoint50—“that was precisely why it became so 
important to prevent Catholic priests from becoming congressional chaplains.”51 
The Marsh Court also downplayed the opposition to legislative prayer by some 
of the Founding Fathers. Although the Court acknowledged that John Jay and John 
Rutledge opposed the practice,52 it did not “agree that evidence of opposition to a 
measure weakens the force of the historical argument; indeed it infuses it with 
power by demonstrating that the subject was considered carefully and the action 
not taken thoughtlessly.”53 It is difficult to take this argument seriously. Essentially, 
the Court asserted that a practice or policy deserves greater deference when it was 
less popular at the time of its adoption. 
The majority also failed to mention that both James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson opposed governmental prayer. Although Madison, while in Congress, 
voted in favor of the appropriations bill that authorized the payment of 
congressional chaplains, he “consistently opposed the chaplaincies throughout his 
political life.”54 As President, Jefferson “refused to issue Thanksgiving prayers 
because he understood them to violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition 
against governmental ‘recommendation’ of religion.”55 The positions of Madison 
and Jefferson cast serious doubt over the Marsh Court’s hasty conclusion that the 
drafters of the First Amendment “saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause 
arising from a practice of [legislative] prayer.”56 
B. Unresolved Questions 
Why would the Court rest its decision on such a weak historical foundation? Justice 
Scalia’s theory of self-preservation57 may have been a factor. Justice Brennan alluded 
to this possibility at the end of his dissent: “If the Court had struck down legislative 
prayer today, it would likely have stimulated a furious reaction.”58 The majority 
opinion observed that the practice of legislative prayer had continued uninterrupted in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Id. at 1191–92. 
 50. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). 
 51. Lund, supra note 42, at 1213. 
 52. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Lund, supra note 42, at 1185–86 (citing Andy G. Olree, James Madison and 
Legislative Chaplains, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 221 (2008)); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
807–08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that after Madison left the Presidency, he wrote that 
congressional chaplains were inconsistent with the Constitution and with religious freedom). 
 55. Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten 
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1128 (2006). 
 56. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791. 
 57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 58. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 822 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Congress since it first began,59 and it had been “followed consistently in most of the 
states.”60 Justice Brennan was surely correct that striking down such a widely accepted 
practice would provoke a strong, and likely furious, reaction. 
Given the widespread political and popular support for legislative prayer, the Court 
had little choice in the matter. Lund compared Marsh to the controversy the Court 
faced regarding the inclusion of the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.61 
In both cases, “while precedent clearly led to the conclusion that the government’s 
action was unconstitutional, political realities cut strongly the other way.”62 
Whatever the reasons for the Court’s decision in Marsh, the lower courts were 
stuck with it. Unfortunately, the decision proved difficult to interpret and 
implement. The language of the majority opinion left open several questions that 
must be answered when deciding a legislative prayer case, and various courts 
provided inconsistent answers.63 
First, it was unclear whether Marsh required legislative prayers to be 
nonsectarian. In determining that the prayers delivered by the Nebraska 
legislature’s chaplain, Robert Palmer, did not violate the Establishment Clause, the 
Court noted that his prayers were “in the Judeo-Christian tradition.”64 In a footnote, 
the Court then added, “Palmer characterizes his prayers as ‘nonsectarian,’ ‘Judeo 
Christian,’ and with ‘elements of the American civil religion.’ Although some of his 
earlier prayers were often explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all references to 
Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish legislator.”65 Did this footnote mean that 
only nonsectarian prayers pass constitutional muster under Marsh? In County of 
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,66 the 
Supreme Court said yes: “The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate 
this principle because the particular chaplain had removed all references to Christ.”67 
Despite this pronouncement from the Allegheny Court, the question remained 
unsettled until Galloway. There, the Court ruled that sectarian prayers are 
permissible, as long as the prayer practice does not reflect an attempt “to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”68 
Another key holding from Marsh that required clarification was the proscription 
on impermissible motives. When evaluating whether Palmer’s sixteen-year tenure 
as chaplain violated the Establishment Clause, the Court determined that “Palmer 
was reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were acceptable to 
the body appointing him.”69 The Court held that, “[a]bsent proof that the chaplain’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Id. at 788. 
 60. Id. at 788–89. 
 61. Lund, supra note 42, at 1209 (referring to Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1 (2004)). 
 62. Lund, supra note 42, at 1209. 
 63. See infra Part II. 
 64. Marsh, 463 U.S at 793. 
 65. Id. at 793 n.14 (citations omitted). 
 66. 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 67. Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014) (quoting Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 794–95). 
 69. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793. 
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reappointment stemmed from an impermissible motive, . . . his long tenure does not 
in itself conflict with the Establishment Clause.”70 The Court failed to define 
exactly what would constitute an impermissible motive, but it implied that 
choosing a prayer giver for the purpose of advancing a particular religion would be 
impermissible.71 Unfortunately, this language will likely continue to cause 
problems for lower courts because Galloway also referred to “an impermissible 
government purpose”72 without defining the term. 
Additionally, it was unclear when (if ever) a court should review the contents of 
particular prayers. The Marsh Court explained: 
The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, 
there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation 
or to parse the content of a particular prayer.73 
This suggests that the content of a prayer should only be evaluated when there is 
evidence that “the prayer opportunity has been exploited.”74 But this is problematic 
because the best evidence of exploitation will often be the contents of the prayers 
themselves. In such a case, would a court be permitted to review the prayers, or is 
extrinsic evidence of exploitation required? 
Perhaps most importantly, if we assume that Marsh’s historical inquiry is not the 
proper framework for analyzing a legislative prayer case, should the Lemon test or 
some other test be applied? The Galloway majority, like the Marsh Court, relied on 
the history of legislative prayer, but Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion reflected a 
preference for the so-called coercion test over other Establishment Clause tests.75 
II. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
A review of recent legislative prayer cases in the circuit courts will shed further 
light on Marsh’s shortcomings. An examination of how Galloway clarified—or 
failed to clarify—the questions raised by Marsh reveals that a lower court will still 
be in a difficult position when faced with a legislative prayer case. These 
difficulties lead to the conclusion that legislative prayer and the Establishment 
Clause are simply incompatible.76 Although the Galloway Court abrogated 
Allegheny and approved sectarian prayers,77 this Part begins by reviewing the ways 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Id. at 793–94. 
 71. See id. at 793 (“We cannot, any more than Members of the Congresses of this 
century, perceive any suggestion that choosing a clergyman of one denomination advances 
the beliefs of a particular church.”). 
 72. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1824. 
 73. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95. 
 74. Id. at 794. 
 75. See infra Part III.C. 
 76. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious 
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1023 (2010) (“Religious liberty for all cannot really be 
served in any legislative prayer scheme.” (emphasis in original)). 
 77. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823 (“In rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer 
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that the circuit courts addressed this question before Galloway, and by asking 
whether Galloway answered that question correctly. 
A. Should Legislative Prayers Be Nonsectarian? 
As a matter of interpretation, the Galloway Court’s conclusion that Marsh did not 
require nonsectarian prayers seems correct. The word “nonsectarian” appeared just 
once in Marsh’s majority opinion—and only in a footnote, at that.78 Lund noted that 
Allegheny’s interpretation of Marsh was “a revisionary sort of summary.”79 The 
Court transformed the chaplain’s removal of the references to Christ from a mere 
“background fact” into “a central holding of the case.”80 Even assuming Galloway 
correctly interpreted Marsh, should there be a nonsectarian requirement? 
In a 2008 article,81 Kenneth A. Klukowski made a compelling argument that 
perhaps nonsectarian prayers should not be required. If naming a particular deity—
such as Christ—renders a prayer impermissibly sectarian, then all members of 
religions whose faiths require them to pray in the name of a specific deity are 
categorically excluded from delivering a prayer.82 Justice Brennan expressed the 
same concern in Marsh.83 The Fourth Circuit confronted this problem in Turner v. 
City Council of Fredericksburg,84 a pre-Galloway case in which a city council 
member challenged the city’s nondenominational prayer policy because his religion 
required him to pray in the name of Jesus Christ.85 In Turner, the court stopped 
short of saying that nonsectarian prayers were constitutionally required, but held 
that the nonsectarian policy fit “squarely within the range of conduct permitted by 
Marsh.”86 Turner’s unwillingness to pray in accordance with the city’s policy did 
not amount to a violation of his First Amendment rights because he “remain[ed] 
free to pray on his own behalf, in nongovernmental endeavors, in the manner 
dictated by his conscience.”87 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Turner was perfectly reasonable—after all, no 
one has a First Amendment right to deliver a legislative prayer. Yet there does 
seem to be something unfair about it. Unless Turner violated his own religious 
                                                                                                                 
must be nonsectarian, the Court does not imply that no constraints remain on its content.”). 
 78. Marsh, 463 U.S at 793 n.14. 
 79. Lund, supra note 76, at 995. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause 
Train Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2008). 
 82. Id. at 255. 
 83. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Some would find a prayer not 
invoking the name of Christ to represent a flawed view of the relationship between human 
beings and God.” (emphasis in original)); see also Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh: 
Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and the Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
713, 730 (2009) (“Some spiritual leaders, when given the choice between offering a 
nondenominational, nonsectarian prayer or no prayer at all, will certainly choose the latter. 
This choice therefore discriminates against those clergy who want to offer sectarian prayers 
and those legislators who want to hear them.”). 
 84. 534 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 85. Id. at 353–54. 
 86. Id. at 356. 
 87. Id. 
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beliefs, he could not participate in the city’s supposedly nondenominational prayer 
practice. If the Establishment Clause truly commands “that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another,”88 then a policy that 
prefers religions that do not require adherents to pray to specific deities is difficult 
to justify. On the other hand, the court could have relied on Marsh’s prohibition of 
“impermissible motives”89 and ruled against the city because Turner had been 
excluded on the basis of his religious beliefs. This result would have been just as 
defensible as the one the Fourth Circuit actually reached. This sort of problem, 
where there seemingly is no right answer, is typical of legislative prayer cases in 
the post-Marsh era. 
Three years after Turner, the Fourth Circuit ruled on another legislative prayer 
practice in Joyner v. Forsyth County.90 The case involved a challenge to the 
Forsyth County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice, which involved prayers 
delivered by volunteers from religious congregations in the community.91 The court 
struck down the policy because, based on its interpretation of Marsh and 
Allegheny,92 the prayers were impermissibly sectarian; “[a]lmost four-fifths of the 
prayers delivered after the adoption of the policy referenced Jesus Christ. None of 
the prayers mentioned any other deity.”93 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit gave a 
ringing endorsement to the nonsectarian standard: “Sectarian prayers must not 
serve as the gateway to citizen participation in the affairs of local government. To 
have them do so runs afoul of the promise of public neutrality among faiths that 
resides at the heart of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.”94 
Justice Kagan made a similar argument in her Galloway dissent. She objected to 
Justice Kennedy’s claim that sectarian prayers could be “part of our heritage and 
tradition, part of our expressive idiom,”95 and argued that such prayers “express 
beliefs that are fundamental to some, foreign to others—and because that is so they 
carry the ever-present potential to both exclude and divide.”96 
Both sides of this debate present strong arguments. On one hand, requiring 
nonsectarian prayers would unintentionally exclude people whose religions require 
them to pray to certain deities. And, as the Galloway majority argued, such a 
requirement would force legislatures and courts “to act as supervisors and censors 
of religious speech,”97 further entangling the government with religion. On the 
other hand, allowing sectarian prayers would cause feelings of exclusion and 
division for members of other faiths, particularly religious minorities. The 
unavoidability of this conflict demonstrates that any legislative prayer practice 
likely violates the neutrality principle and therefore the Establishment Clause. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 89. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–94 (1983). 
 90. 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 91. Id. at 342–43. 
 92. See id. at 352 (noting that “Allegheny read Marsh as precluding sectarian prayer” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 93. Id. at 353. 
 94. Id. at 342–43. 
 95. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 96. Id. at 1853 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 1822. 
418 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:407 
 
B. Impermissible Motives and Religious Discrimination 
Both Marsh and Galloway included references to “impermissible” motives or 
purposes.98 Although neither case defined the term, it would presumably be 
impermissible for a government entity to exclude someone from its prayer practice 
solely because of her religious beliefs.99 That was one of the issues faced by the 
Fourth Circuit in Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors.100 
This case concerned a challenge to the county’s prayer practice by Cynthia 
Simpson, a member of the Reclaiming Tradition of Wicca who had identified 
herself as a witch when she asked to be added to the list of potential prayer 
givers.101 The County Attorney refused her request because the “non-sectarian 
invocations [were] traditionally made to a divinity that [was] consistent with the 
Judeo-Christian tradition.”102 Simpson contended that this amounted to an 
impermissible advancement of Judeo-Christian religions.103 The court never 
seriously considered the possibility that the county had relied on an impermissible 
motive in rejecting Simpson’s request,104 instead upholding the prayer practice 
because the policy “aspired to non-sectarianism,”105 had “achieved diversity,”106 
and was “wide enough . . . to include Islam.”107 These are all admirable qualities, 
but they have no bearing on the central issue in the case—that Simpson’s request to 
be included among the county’s prayer givers was denied expressly because of her 
religious beliefs. As Lund noted, the case “seems to vitiate the impermissible 
motive requirement altogether; it is hard to imagine a clearer case of 
denominational discrimination than what happened to Cynthia Simpson.”108 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Id. at 1824 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or 
betray an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a 
prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 793–94 (1983) (“Absent proof that the chaplain’s reappointment stemmed from an 
impermissible motive, we conclude that his long tenure does not in itself conflict with the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 99. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held that the impermissible motive 
standard “prohibits purposeful discrimination.” Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 
1281 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 100. 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 101. Id. at 278–80. 
 102. Id. at 280. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The court’s application of the impermissible motive requirement amounted to a 
single sentence: “Marsh’s caution against ‘impermissible motives’ does not fasten on local 
governments a limitation to a prayer-giver from one religious view.” Id. at 287 (emphasis in 
original). While this statement is undoubtedly true, it is difficult to see how it is at all 
relevant to the facts of the case. 
 105. Id. at 284. 
 106. Id. at 285. 
 107. Id. at 286. 
 108. Lund, supra note 76, at 1027–28; accord Fourth Circuit Holds That Local 
Government May Restrict the Leading of Its Invocations to Representatives of Judeo-
Christian Religion: Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1223, 1229 (2006) [hereinafter Fourth Circuit Holds] (“From the viewpoint of 
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Interestingly, Simpson would have been wrongly decided even under 
Galloway’s more permissive standard. One of Galloway’s few requirements is that 
the government entity maintain “a policy of nondiscrimination.”109 By excluding 
Simpson because of her religious beliefs, Chesterfield County failed that test. 
Unfortunately, the Galloway Court did not specify which government purposes are 
impermissible or discriminatory, and therefore produced a standard as vague and 
malleable as Marsh itself. Consequently, some future plaintiffs may suffer the same 
fate as Simpson. 
C. When May Courts Review the Content of Prayers? 
In Pelphrey v. Cobb County,110 the Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to a 
county commission’s prayer practice. A rotating group of volunteers delivered the 
prayers.111 The plaintiffs, relying on Allegheny’s interpretation of Marsh, argued 
that the prayers were impermissibly sectarian.112 The court held that the county’s 
“diversity of speakers . . . support[ed] the finding that the County did not exploit 
the prayers to advance any one religion,”113 even though 96.6% of the prayer givers 
were Christian and 70% of the prayers included Christian references.114 Further, the 
court avoided any examination of the prayers’ language by citing Marsh for the 
proposition that a court should not evaluate or parse a prayer’s content unless there 
is evidence that the prayer opportunity has been exploited.115 
In Joyner, the Fourth Circuit took the opposite approach and provided a 
persuasive answer to the question of when—and why—courts may review the 
contents of specific prayers under Marsh. The dissent objected to the majority’s 
examination of the references to Christ in the prayers.116 The majority responded by 
explaining that Marsh only prevents a court from examining the prayers if there is 
no evidence that the prayer opportunity has been exploited.117 The court expanded 
on this concept: 
[T]he dissent gives the impression that virtually any review by the 
majority of the invocations under challenge would constitute 
impermissible “parsing.” Quite simply, this stark approach leaves the 
                                                                                                                 
religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradition, however, the Board’s policy is more 
exclusive than inclusive. . . . [L]imiting eligibility to Judeo-Christianity excludes in terms of 
religious diversity far more than it includes.”). 
 109. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014). 
 110. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 111. Id. at 1266. 
 112. See id. (“The taxpayers argue that the Establishment Clause permits only 
nonsectarian prayers . . . .”). 
 113. Id. at 1277. 
 114. Id. at 1267. 
 115. Id. at 1272 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983)). 
 116. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 361 (4th Cir. 2011) (Niemeyer, J., 
dissenting) (“This focus by the majority on the December 17 prayer, simply because of its 
description of Jesus’ role in Christianity, is precisely the content-inquiry that Marsh intended 
to foreclose. With such an inquiry, must we now determine how many times the name Jesus 
is spoken or what description of him is given?”). 
 117. Id. at 351–52. 
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court without the ability to decide the case, by barring any substantive 
consideration of the very practice under challenge. It is to say the least 
an odd view of the judicial function that denies courts the right to 
review the practice at issue. For to exercise no review at all—to shut 
our eyes to patterns of sectarian prayer in public forums—is to 
surrender the essence of the Establishment Clause and allow 
government to throw its weight behind a particular faith. Marsh did not 
countenance any such idea.118 
This is a reasonable understanding of the language in Marsh. Marsh’s prohibition 
on parsing prayers should only be applied when the content of the prayers is not an 
issue (where, for example, a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a prayer 
practice in general but makes no allegations regarding specific prayers). But when a 
plaintiff claims that the nature and language of the prayers made the prayer practice 
impermissible, the prayers’ content will obviously be essential to the court’s 
evaluation. The Galloway Court provided a slightly different interpretation: 
Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray 
an impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the 
content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation. 
Marsh, indeed, requires an inquiry into the prayer opportunity as a whole, 
rather than into the contents of a single prayer.119 
While this approach initially seems fair and reasonable, it leads to unacceptable 
results. The Galloway Court acknowledged that one of the town’s prayer givers 
referred to the plaintiffs as a “minority . . . ignorant of the history of our 
country,”120 and that this attack “strayed from the rationale set out in Marsh,”121 but 
nonetheless “[did] not despoil a practice that on the whole reflects and embraces 
our tradition.”122 The Supreme Court essentially said, in other words, “It’s OK if 
the government’s prayers disparage the religious beliefs of others, so long as they 
don’t do it too often.” Any American who respects the First Amendment and 
religious liberty should be appalled. 
As the cases discussed in this Part demonstrate, Galloway did not resolve many 
of the issues the circuit courts struggled with in the years following Marsh. The 
Court did clarify (for better or worse) that legislative prayers may be sectarian. But 
Galloway brought us no closer to a workable definition of an “impermissible” 
motive or purpose, and the Court expanded Marsh with its rationale that the 
prayers’ content may only be examined when a plaintiff challenges an entire pattern 
of prayers. A single prayer, no matter how offensive, is effectively unreviewable. 
The inconsistent results in the circuit courts prove that Marsh (and therefore 
Galloway) is too malleable, too easily manipulated. The frequent presence of 
compelling arguments on both sides suggests that it may be impossible to craft a 
legislative prayer policy that does not violate someone’s constitutional rights. The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Id. at 351. 
 119. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014). 
 120. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 121. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1824. 
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following Part addresses the Galloway case in greater detail and evaluates the 
impact this landmark decision will have on future Establishment Clause cases. 
III. TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY 
A. The Town’s Prayer Practice 
In Galloway, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the legislative 
prayer practice in the town of Greece, New York, a Rochester suburb with a 
population of about 94,000.123 Plaintiffs Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens 
claimed that the town board violated the Establishment Clause by starting its 
monthly board meetings with prayers.124 The board implemented its prayer practice 
in 1999 (meetings previously began with moments of silence).125 The prayer givers 
appeared by invitation; a town employee solicited local clergy by calling religious 
organizations that were listed in the town’s Community Guide.126 All of the prayer 
givers from 1999 through 2007 were Christian.127 Galloway and Stephens first 
complained about the prayer practice in 2008.128 That year, four non-Christians 
delivered prayers; in 2009 and 2010, “all the prayer-givers were once again invited 
Christian clergy.”129 About two-thirds of the prayers “contained uniquely Christian 
language.”130 When delivering a prayer, the speaker faced the citizens attending the 
meeting, with his or her back to the members of the board.131 The prayer givers 
“often asked members of the audience to participate by bowing their heads, 
standing, or joining in the prayer.”132 
When Galloway and Stephens filed suit, they claimed that the town’s selection 
procedure preferred Christianity over other faiths, and that the prayer practice was 
impermissibly sectarian.133 They later abandoned their claim of intentional 
discrimination against non-Christians, eliminating the impermissible motive 
issue.134 The town claimed that anyone who volunteered could give a prayer, 
including atheists, and that it had never rejected such a request.135 The town 
admitted, however, that it had never publicized this opportunity to the town’s 
residents.136 The town did not review the prayers in advance, and it asserted that “it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Id. at 1816. 
 124. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 
1811 (2014). 
 125. Id. at 23. 
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 130. Id. at 24. 
 131. Brief for Respondents at 8–9, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) 
(No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5230742, at *8–9. 
 132. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23. 
 133. Id. at 25. 
 134. Id. at 26. 
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would not censor an invocation, no matter how unusual or offensive its content.”137 
Indeed, the town took no action even after the prayer that described opponents of 
the town’s practice as a “minority . . . ignorant of the history of our country.”138 
B. The Second Circuit Opinion 
The Second Circuit ruled that the town’s prayer practice violated the 
Establishment Clause,139 but did not read Allegheny as a requirement that all 
legislative prayers be nonsectarian.140 Instead of applying a strict nonsectarian 
requirement, the court resolved the Establishment Clause question by asking 
whether the town’s practice, viewed in its totality by an ordinary, 
reasonable observer, conveyed the view that the town favored or 
disfavored certain religious beliefs. In other words, we must ask 
whether the town, through its prayer practice, has established particular 
religious beliefs as the more acceptable ones, and others as less 
acceptable.141 
While this fact-specific inquiry might appear to be a rejection of Marsh, the court 
justified its deviation on the grounds that Marsh itself “addressed a series of 
case-specific concerns raised by the plaintiff.”142 The court ostensibly declined to 
apply the Lemon test143 or any other Establishment Clause test because Marsh did 
not follow that approach,144 and the court believed that Marsh should be the 
“touchstone” of its analysis.145 
Despite these statements to the contrary, the Second Circuit’s analysis had a 
distinctly Lemon flavor.146 Specifically, the opinion calls to mind Justice O’Connor’s 
“endorsement test,” which was an interpretation of the effect prong of the Lemon 
test.147 Although the Second Circuit never used the phrase “endorsement test,” it 
struck down Greece’s prayer practice because it amounted to an endorsement of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 25; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 139. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 32 (“[W]e find that on the totality of the circumstances 
presented the town’s prayer practice identified the town with Christianity in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 140. Id. at 28. 
 141. Id. at 29–30 (footnote omitted). 
 142. Id. at 30. 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 144. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. 
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 147. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under 
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to 
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religion148 and “convey[ed] to a reasonable objective observer under the totality of 
the circumstances an official affiliation with a particular religion.”149 
By implicitly relying on the endorsement test, the Second Circuit stumbled 
(perhaps unwittingly) into a debate about what should be the prevailing analytical 
framework in Establishment Clause cases. The most important legacy of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Galloway may be its impact on that larger 
Establishment Clause debate, rather than its effects on legislative prayer itself. 
C. The Supreme Court Decision and Its Future Effects 
1. The Coercion Argument 
Although the Second Circuit relied on an endorsement analysis, Galloway and 
Stephens did not urge the Supreme Court to adopt that reasoning on appeal. 
Instead, they once again argued that the prayer practice was impermissibly 
sectarian, and that the prayers were a form of governmental coercion.150 As noted 
above, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) abrogated Allegheny by holding that Marsh 
does not require nonsectarian prayers.151 The coercion argument—and the Court’s 
response to it—requires a more detailed explanation. 
Before the Second Circuit, Galloway and Stephens argued that the presence of 
children at the meetings created a threat of religious coercion.152 Children 
sometimes led the Pledge of Allegiance and high school students could fulfill a 
civics requirement by attending the meetings.153 The board also invited children to 
the meetings to receive awards.154 
Galloway and Stephens likely referred to children when objecting to the 
coercive potential of the prayer policy because the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause coercion doctrine was developed in two school prayer cases, Lee v. 
Weisman155 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.156 In Lee, the Court 
(with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority) ruled that a school had violated the 
Establishment Clause by having a rabbi deliver a nonsectarian prayer at a 
graduation ceremony.157 The Court found that “prayer exercises in public schools 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30. 
 149. Id. at 34. 
 150. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1820 (2014). 
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 154. Brief for Respondents at 27, supra note 131, at *27. 
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 157. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 594–96. 
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carry a particular risk of indirect coercion,”158 and that the school had placed 
“public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group 
or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.”159 In 
Santa Fe, the Supreme Court struck down a school’s practice of beginning high 
school football games with student-led prayers partly because it would be coercive 
to force the students to choose “between attending [the football] games and 
avoiding personally offensive religious rituals.”160 
However, Galloway and Stephens could not simply rely on Lee and Santa Fe 
because the Court’s approach to legislative prayer has been much more deferential 
than its approach to school prayer. In 1962, Engel v. Vitale161 held that New York 
could not use its public school system to encourage the recitation of prayers.162 
After Engel, federal courts have consistently enforced the separation of prayer and 
public education.163 Marsh required no such separation in the legislative prayer 
context.164 Perhaps for this reason, Galloway and Stephens did not limit their 
coercion argument to the prayers’ effects on children. They asserted that they had 
personally felt coerced by requests to participate in the prayers, and that they “felt 
isolated, embarrassed, and humiliated when they [had] declined to participate while 
those around them stared.”165 
Furthermore, Galloway and Stephens argued, a citizen who attends a meeting to 
request a permit or to seek some other action from the board would feel coerced to 
participate in the prayer or risk having her request denied.166 During oral 
arguments, Justice Kagan expressed similar concerns: 
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 161. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 162. Id. at 424. 
 163. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312 (striking down prayers before high school 
football games); Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (striking down prayers at high school graduation 
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ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 385–86 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying Lemon 
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 164. See generally supra Part I. 
 165. Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 15. 
 166. Id. at 24 (“[A]pplicants cannot afford to offend anyone. Perhaps no Board member 
would think less of a citizen who refused to participate in the prayer. But the citizen has no 
way to know.” (emphasis in original)). 
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[W]hat troubles me about this case is that here a citizen is going to a 
local community board, supposed to be the closest, the most responsive 
institution of government that exists, and is immediately being asked, 
being forced to identify whether she believes in the things that most of 
the people in the room believe in, whether she belongs to the same 
religious idiom as most of the people in the room do. 
And it strikes me that that might be inconsistent with this 
understanding that when we relate to our government, we all do so as 
Americans, and not as Jews and not as Christians and not as 
nonbelievers.167 
This is one of the most important factual differences between Galloway and 
Marsh. As Galloway and Stephens argued in their brief, “In both Congress and state 
legislatures, ordinary citizens are excluded from the legislative floor and confined to 
a gallery. They are mere spectators, not permitted to address the legislative body and 
with no business to conduct before it.”168 The direct interaction between citizens and 
government officials in the town meeting context creates a greater risk of infringing 
on individuals’ First Amendment rights and a greater risk of conveying the 
impression that the government prefers certain religious views over others. 
The Town of Greece responded to the claims of coercion by arguing that 
because the town never “compelled anyone to pray or to agree with the viewpoints 
of the prayer-givers, or . . . conditioned any governmental benefits on participation, 
the mere fact that attendees at meetings might disagree with a prayer [was] 
insufficient to constitute an Establishment Clause violation.”169 But even if 
participation in the prayers was not compelled, being required to attend a religious 
ceremony or exercise still violates the Establishment Clause.170 Participation in 
democracy is one of the most fundamental rights of American citizenship.171 It is a 
violation of the Establishment Clause to require citizens to attend a religious 
ceremony they may not agree with—especially when it contains sectarian 
references to a God they may not believe in—before they are allowed to participate 
in the democratic process.172 If the school district in Santa Fe could not force its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 
(2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5939896, at *24. 
 168. Brief for Respondents, supra note 131, at 42. 
 169. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 
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students to choose between attending football games and hearing unwanted 
prayers,173 then surely the Town of Greece could not force its citizens to choose 
between participating in democracy and hearing unwanted prayers, right? 
Wrong, said Justice Kennedy. 
In his plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
Justice Kennedy declared that “legislative bodies do not engage in impermissible 
coercion merely by exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and 
in which they need not participate.”174 He stated that no coercion exists “where the 
prayers neither chastised dissenters nor attempted lengthy disquisition on religious 
dogma,”175 and where the citizens “are free to enter and leave with little comment 
and for any number of reasons.”176 Of course, at least one prayer did chastise 
dissenters,177 and the prayers did include statements of religious dogma,178 and people 
attending a graduation ceremony or a football game may also enter and leave for any 
number of reasons. Justice Kennedy nonetheless determined (somehow) that the 
prayers in Galloway were less coercive than those in Lee or Santa Fe. 
Before analyzing the likely effects of the Court’s decision, it may be helpful to 
consider why Galloway and Stephens based their argument on coercion rather than 
endorsement. After all, the Second Circuit ruled in their favor by applying a version 
of the endorsement test,179 and the coercion test is generally more permissive of 
governmental religious practices. The endorsement test prohibits government 
actions that “convey a message of endorsement or disapproval” of religion.180 The 
coercion test, meanwhile, states that “government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”181 Consequently, Professor 
Kyle Langvardt has noted that “[o]ne would expect that all government religious 
speech would survive under a coercion approach.”182 The plaintiffs’ decision to rely 
on a coercion argument therefore seems curious. 
Perhaps Galloway and Stephens simply (and reasonably) believed they 
possessed a stronger argument for government coercion than the arguments that 
had prevailed in Lee and Santa Fe.183 However, Becket Fund advocate Eric 
Rassbach argued that the plaintiffs were trying to rescue “the ailing endorsement 
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test.”184 According to this theory, the plaintiffs avoided making an endorsement 
argument before the Supreme Court so that the Court would not have an opportunity 
to overrule the endorsement test.185 If that was their intention, they succeeded.186 
Although Rassbach acknowledged that “the courts of appeals almost uniformly 
[rely] on Lemon/endorsement as the main way to decide Establishment Clause 
cases,”187 he contended that endorsement has fallen out of favor with the Supreme 
Court.188 Professor Ian Bartrum offered a similar interpretation, speculating that the 
Court agreed to hear the case because “some Justices [saw] an opportunity to 
reconsider the so-called endorsement test that now governs many Establishment 
Clause questions.”189 Additionally, scholars have argued for several years that the 
coercion test is gaining traction as an analytical framework in Establishment Clause 
cases.190 Galloway’s ultimate legacy may be its role in the struggle between the 
endorsement and coercion tests. 
2. Galloway’s Impact 
While it would be premature to make any sweeping statements about the 
long-term effects of the Galloway decision, there are a few safe conclusions. First, 
the Supreme Court will likely not revisit the issue of legislative prayer for a number 
of years, if ever. More than thirty years passed between the Court’s decisions in 
Marsh and Galloway. And the Court stated that, “[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that 
over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose, a 
challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely establish a 
constitutional violation,”191 which suggests the Court is getting out of the 
legislative prayer adjudication business. 
Second, the Justices who favor the coercion test will attempt to extend Galloway to 
Establishment Clause cases that do not involve legislative prayer. Less than two 
months after the Galloway decision, the Court denied certiorari in a case where the 
Seventh Circuit had applied the endorsement test and declared that a school’s decision 
to hold its graduation ceremony in a Christian church violated the Establishment 
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Clause.192 Justice Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari and argued that “Town 
of Greece abandoned the antiquated ‘endorsement test,’ which formed the basis for the 
decision below.”193 Although Galloway did not apply the endorsement test—possibly 
because Galloway and Stephens’s argument did not rely on it194—it would be a rather 
large stretch to suggest that it abandoned the endorsement test for all time, in all 
circumstances. If the Justices in the Galloway majority make a concerted effort to 
expand and distort the decision beyond its true holding, Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky’s fear that “the Roberts Court is eroding the notion of a wall separating 
church and state and allowing much more religious involvement in government and 
government support for religion”195 may prove to be well-founded. 
Third, the circuit courts will not immediately change their approach to all 
Establishment Clause cases because of the Galloway decision. Although the 
Supreme Court overruled the Second Circuit in Galloway, the Second Circuit has 
not changed its approach to Establishment Clause cases that do not involve 
legislative prayer. In Newdow v. Peterson,196 a post-Galloway case that involved an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the use of the phrase “In God We Trust” on 
currency,197 the Second Circuit applied the Lemon test and noted that “Lemon 
remains the prevailing test in this Circuit, absent its abrogation.”198 And in 
American Atheists, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,199 another 
post-Galloway case, the Second Circuit applied the Lemon and endorsement tests200 
to an Establishment Clause challenge regarding the display at the National September 
11 Memorial and Museum of a steel cross recovered from the World Trade Center.201 
Thus it appears that, at least in the Second Circuit, Galloway is viewed as a decision 
on legislative prayer alone, not on the Establishment Clause as a whole. 
D. A Question of Purpose 
When evaluating these questions—whether Marsh and Galloway were correctly 
decided and whether endorsement or coercion is the proper Establishment Clause 
test—it helps to think about purpose. What is the purpose of legislative prayer and, 
more broadly, what is the purpose of the Establishment Clause? 
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Courts and commentators alike have struggled to pin down the purpose of 
legislative prayer. Justice O’Connor famously wrote that governmental 
acknowledgments of religion such as legislative prayer “serve, in the only ways 
reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing 
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the 
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”202 Professor Lund argued 
that the purpose “is to foster an inclusive legislative atmosphere.”203 
Justice Kennedy himself proposed several different (sometimes contradictory) 
theories about the purposes of legislative prayer in his Galloway opinion. First, he 
asserted that the prayers were “intended to place town board members in a solemn 
and deliberative frame of mind, invoke divine guidance in town affairs, and follow 
a tradition practiced by Congress and dozens of state legislatures.”204 He also 
claimed that legislative prayer “lends gravity to public business, reminds 
lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and 
expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society,”205 and that it 
“reflect[s] values long part of the Nation’s heritage.”206 He argued that the 
lawmakers themselves were the principal audience for the prayers,207 and that the 
purpose was to “accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them 
to a tradition dating to the time of the Framers.”208 Yet he also claimed that the 
purpose was to “acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private 
citizens,”209 and to acknowledge “the central place that religion, and religious 
institutions, hold in the lives of those present.”210 Justice Kagan put it more bluntly, 
noting that the prayers were “directed squarely at the citizens,”211 and that “the 
chaplain leads, as the first part of a town meeting, a highly intimate (albeit 
relatively brief) prayer service, with the public serving as his congregation.”212 
All of the secular purposes listed above—solemnizing the occasion, fostering an 
inclusive atmosphere, putting legislators in a deliberative frame of mind, etc.—
could be accomplished easily by something other than prayer.213 Justice 
O’Connor’s claim that legislative prayer is one of “the only ways reasonably 
possible in our culture”214 to accomplish these objectives is plainly wrong. Whether 
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the government may constitutionally engage in the more religious purposes listed 
above, such as accommodating the spiritual needs of legislators, depends on one’s 
interpretation of the purpose of the Establishment Clause. 
This question ultimately lies at the heart of legislative prayer cases and the debate 
between the endorsement and coercion tests. The endorsement test, which prohibits 
the government from endorsing or disapproving of religion,215 is grounded in the 
neutrality principle. As Justice Douglas once wrote, “The First Amendment teaches 
that a government neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious 
interests.”216 The coercion test, meanwhile, is more compatible with Justice Scalia’s 
philosophy that “there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion 
generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a 
nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”217 Under the most 
literal interpretation of the test, the Establishment Clause would prohibit only 
coercion “by force of law and threat of penalty.”218 
The problem with Justice Scalia’s view, and with the coercion test in general, is 
that it would not even prohibit an official establishment of a state religion. As Justice 
Stevens put it, “A Clause so interpreted would not prohibit explicit state 
endorsements of religious orthodoxies of particular sects, actions that lie at the heart 
of what the Clause was meant to regulate. The government could, for example, take 
out television advertisements lauding Catholicism as the only pure religion.”219 
Therefore, the coercion test cannot be the correct analytical framework for 
Establishment Clause cases. The endorsement test, which is faithful to the 
longstanding neutrality principle220 and the purposes of the First Amendment, is the 
far superior option. Because all legislative prayers endorse religion over 
nonreligion, the practice is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court wrongly decided 
both Marsh and Galloway, and these decisions should be overruled.  
IV. THE RISING NONE AND THE FALL OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
JUSTICE SCALIA: You want to pick the groups we’re going to exclude? 
MR. [DOUGLAS] LAYCOCK: I think you picked them, Your Honor. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: The Baha’i, who else? These—these groups are too small 
to— 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We’ve already excluded the atheists, right? 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Yeah, the atheists are out already.221 
Two separate but related causes help explain the Supreme Court’s deviation 
from the neutrality principle in legislative prayer cases. First, the strategic model of 
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judicial decision making demonstrates that institutional pressures on the Court 
influence its decisions. Because legislative prayer receives such strong support 
from other governmental institutions and the general public, there is a great amount 
of pressure on the Court to uphold the practice, even though the Establishment 
Clause “mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion.”222 Second, these cases evince a longstanding 
governmental disregard for religious minorities, such as polytheists and atheists, 
who believe in anything other than a monotheistic God. This final Part will 
examine both of these causes in turn, and will explain how shifting religious 
attitudes in America and the increasing number of Nones—those who do not 
identify with any particular religion—will ultimately lead to the elimination of 
legislative prayer. Finally, a few alternatives that could replace legislative prayer 
will be proposed. 
A. Institutional Pressures 
As previously noted, Justice Scalia has suggested that the Court’s interest in 
self-preservation leads it to occasionally ignore the neutrality principle.223 The 
strategic model explains why the Court would be concerned with self-preservation 
in the first place. In a nutshell, this model supposes that judges understand that 
“they are constrained in their powers by the operation of outsiders, which may 
include the Congress, the President, the general public, state governments, private 
interest groups, attorneys, litigants, or other entities,” and suggests that “judges 
amend their decisions to account for the preferences of these other actors.”224 In 
applying this model, Professors Frank B. Cross and Blake J. Nelson addressed 
“first stage institutionalism” (the possibility that the Court’s decisions could be 
overruled by congressional legislation) and “second stage institutionalism” (a 
variety of other institutional constraints on the Court).225 Cross and Nelson 
concluded that the second stage institutional concerns have a greater impact on the 
courts.226 This is especially true for constitutional decisions, which are much more 
difficult for Congress to override.227 
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Some of the second stage institutional constraints wielded by Congress include 
“threatened impeachment, jurisdiction restrictions, other legislation limiting court 
powers and reducing the courts’ resources.”228 Although Congress lacks the power to 
reduce judicial salaries, the legislature can withhold salary increases and resources 
such as funding for support staff and courthouses.229 Thus, “Congress may achieve 
indirectly through appropriations what it cannot do directly.”230 
Additionally, local governments and the people themselves wield some 
authority over the courts. If these entities refuse to implement a judicial decision, 
“there is little courts can do.”231 In Brown v. Board of Education,232 for example, 
the Supreme Court’s decision had little effect in desegregating the South until 
President Johnson and Congress took action.233 
Finally, the President also has influence over the Court.234 Due to the President’s 
role in the legislative process, there is a strong incentive for the Court to agree with 
his or her position; “[i]f the President supports the Court over Congress, the 
legislature must muster a two-thirds majority to act against the Court.”235 
Clearly, these institutional concerns affect legislative prayer cases, and did so 
particularly in Galloway. Congress has a vested interest in the Court’s decisions; it 
has employed chaplains since 1789,236 and many of its members would like to 
continue that practice.237 Due to the widespread acceptance and popularity of 
legislative prayer, it is questionable whether the people and local governments 
would accept a decision abolishing the practice—at least one chamber in every 
state legislature begins its sessions with a prayer.238 And in Galloway, the Obama 
Administration urged the Court to uphold the town’s legislative prayer practice.239 
This position was somewhat surprising, considering President Obama’s history 
with religious issues. While running for President in 2008, he famously criticized 
rural Pennsylvanians for “clinging to religion.”240 Perhaps the President succumbed 
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to institutional pressures of his own and sought to take a position that would help 
his image among religious constituents and members of Congress.241 
Furthermore, the Justices themselves have provided evidence that they respond 
to these institutional pressures when deciding Establishment Clause cases. In 
Marsh, Justice Brennan speculated that striking down Nebraska’s prayer practice 
would have “stimulated a furious reaction.”242 During oral arguments in Galloway, 
Justice Kagan expressed concern that invalidating the town’s prayer practice would 
“make the problem worse rather than better.”243 And in Van Orden v. Perry,244 a 
case concerning a Ten Commandments monument, Justice Breyer worried that 
finding the display of the monument unconstitutional would encourage further 
challenges to similar monuments and “thereby create the very kind of religiously 
based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”245 This possibility 
led him to join Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion upholding the 
constitutionality of the monument even though he did not agree with its reasoning.246 
These institutional concerns clearly played a role in Galloway. In addition to 
Justice Kagan’s comments during oral argument,247 the majority claimed that 
abolishing legislative prayer “would create new controversy and begin anew the 
very divisions along religious lines that the Establishment Clause seeks to 
prevent.”248 Indeed, as a practical matter, it may have been impossible to reach any 
other result. Like Marsh before it, Galloway was “politically impossible to affirm 
and legally impossible to reverse.”249 Yet if the purpose underlying these decisions 
was not only to preserve the Court’s political standing but also to avoid religiously 
based divisiveness, then Marsh was a failure. Professor Lund argued that “[a]s long 
as legislative prayer is constitutionally permissible—as long as Marsh lives—these 
fights over legislative prayer will continue, as will the distress that gives rise to 
them.”250 The same can be said for Galloway. 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Preference for Monotheism  
The widespread support for legislative prayer, and therefore the institutional 
pressures that drive the outcomes of legislative prayer cases, can be partially 
explained by the government’s longstanding attitude toward religious minorities. In 
Establishment Clause cases, the government has traditionally shown little concern 
for them. As Justice Scalia argued in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties 
Union of Ky.251: 
One cannot say the word “God,” or “the Almighty,” one cannot offer 
public supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of 
some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods pay no 
attention to human affairs. With respect to public acknowledgment of 
religious belief, it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices 
that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and 
believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of 
devout atheists.252 
This helps explain why the Marsh Court found nothing objectionable about prayers 
delivered exclusively in “the Judeo-Christian tradition,”253 even though that 
tradition does not include the members of many other religious groups. It also 
explains the result in Simpson, where the Fourth Circuit held that Chesterfield 
County’s prayer practice was sufficiently inclusive because it was “wide enough 
. . . to include Islam,”254 despite the plaintiff’s exclusion from the prayer practice 
solely because of her unconventional religious beliefs.255 
Justice Scalia’s disregard of religious minorities was on full display in the 
portion of the oral arguments in Galloway excerpted at the beginning of this Part, in 
which he and Chief Justice Roberts cavalierly bantered about which religious 
groups would be excluded from a hypothetical nonsectarian prayer policy.256 It 
seems that atheists and the Baha’i are among the only religious minority groups that 
government officials may still comfortably and openly discriminate against. Such 
discrimination occurs because the public accepts it. Indeed, some writers have agreed 
with Justice Scalia’s reading of the Establishment Clause.257 Attorney Antony Barone 
Kolenc supported this interpretation because “historically, public acknowledgments 
of religion by all three branches of both state and federal government have been in the 
monotheistic context.”258 In other words, history and the majority rule. 
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Others have rejected this “majority rules” vision of religious liberty. Professor 
Thomas B. Colby sharply criticized Justice Scalia’s McCreary dissent, asserting 
that Scalia believes 
the Establishment Clause permits the government to favor religion over 
nonreligion (but not vice versa), and, in the context of governmental 
religious expression, to favor Judeo-Christian monotheism over all 
other religions (but not vice versa). In other words, in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion, biblical monotheism is now, has always been, and always will 
be, the favored religion of the United States Constitution.259 
This position contradicts “the view that the government cannot ‘constitutionally 
pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, 
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as 
against those religions founded on different beliefs.’”260 Lund also expressed 
concerns about bowing to the will of the majority on religious matters: “Legislative 
prayer is often framed as pitting nonbelievers against believers, but that is an 
oversimplification. Having legislative prayer means committing religious decisions 
to a majoritarian governmental process, which has deep ramifications for all 
religious minorities.”261 
Colby’s and Lund’s views are more in line with the Supreme Court’s decisions 
holding that the Religion Clauses guarantee “religious liberty and equality to the 
infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or 
Judaism”;262 that the government must be neutral between religion and 
nonreligion;263 that “one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another”;264 and that the First Amendment “erected a wall between church and 
state.”265 These holdings have led scholars to the conclusion that “[t]he government 
simply shouldn’t be in the business of endorsing the belief that there is a God, even 
a generic one,”266 and that the government’s proper approach to religious belief is 
agnosticism: “Agnostics have no opinion for epistemological reasons; the 
government must have no opinion for constitutional reasons. The government must 
have no opinion because it is not the government’s role to have an opinion.”267 
Ultimately, shifting religious beliefs in America and the increasing importance of 
the Nones dictate that this latter view will prevail. 
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C. The Rising None 
An abundance of recent data indicates that the number of Americans who have 
no religious affiliation is growing. In a 2013 survey, 20% of respondents indicated 
that they had no religious preference.268 Only 8% reported no religious preference 
in 1990.269 The American Religious Identification Survey found that the percentage 
of Nones had increased from 8.2% in 1990 to 15% in 2008,270 and the Nones had 
the largest percentage share of population growth during that time period.271 
Similarly, the 2008 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey found that 16.1% of 
American adults were unaffiliated with any particular faith,272 and this group was 
“the biggest gainer in this religious competition.”273 People moving into the 
category outnumbered those moving out of it by a margin of more than 
three-to-one.274 Note that the Nones are more than just atheists and agnostics; the 
category also typically includes those who are unaffiliated with a particular 
religion, whether they describe themselves as religious or secular.275 
In fact, the percentage of atheists in America has only increased slightly over 
recent decades. In 2012, just 3% of Americans identified themselves as atheists.276 
This represented an increase from 1% in 1965 and 2% in 1991.277 This modest 
increase in the percentage of atheists led the Institute for the Study of Societal 
Issues to conclude that religious belief is not declining.278 However, the Institute’s 
own data seem to undermine this conclusion. The percentages of atheists, 
agnostics, and those who do not believe in a personal God but believe in a “Higher 
Power” all increased from 1991 through 2012; meanwhile, the percentages of those 
who believe in God some of the time, who believe in God but have doubts, and 
who believe in God without a doubt all decreased over the same time period.279 In 
any case, these sources agree that the percentage of Nones has increased 
dramatically since the early 1990s, indicating that the American population is 
becoming more secular and less attached to particular religious affiliations. 
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One final statistical observation deserves mention: the ascendance of the Nones 
is primarily a youth movement. Gallup Daily tracking information for the year 
2012 found that 27% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 had no religious 
affiliation, compared to 19% for ages 30–49, 14% for ages 50–64, and 10% for 
ages 65 and older.280 Although these numbers could be explained by a theory that 
people become more religious as they grow older, the Institute for the Study of 
Societal Issues rejected that hypothesis: “We suspect that these age differences will 
not diminish as the people in them age. Instead we see them as persisting 
generational differences that are likely to characterize these collections of people 
throughout their life course . . . .”281 
D. The Fall of Legislative Prayer 
What does this all mean for legislative prayer? These religious trends will likely 
continue in the future. Considering the generational data quoted in Part IV.C, it 
appears likely that each succeeding generation of new Americans will be less 
religious than the one before it.282 Additionally, while the nation was more than 98% 
Christian at the time of the founding,283 it was only 78.4% Christian in 2008.284 Even 
if America is still a “Christian nation de facto,”285 it is less Christian than it was two 
centuries ago—and it will likely be even less Christian in the future. 
For legislative prayer to be abolished, it is not necessary that the Nones 
eventually become the majority (or that Christians become a minority). Minorities 
have achieved civil rights victories before the Supreme Court without ever 
becoming a majority of the population.286 What matters is that a significant portion 
of the public—and, therefore, the people’s elected representatives—become 
sympathetic to the cause. 
As time passes and Americans become more secular and less attached to 
religion, they will likely also grow less tolerant of the Court’s preference for 
monotheistic religions—and Christianity in particular—over all others. Such a shift 
would remove the institutional pressures that have forced the Court to uphold 
legislative prayer until now. The will of the people would trickle down to Congress 
and the Presidency, removing the pressures imposed by the legislative and 
executive branches. At that time, the Court would be free to strike down legislative 
prayer and bring this area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence into line with the 
Constitution’s promise of religious neutrality for all. 
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This sea change did not arrive in time to benefit Galloway and Stephens, but the 
cracks in legislative prayer’s armor have already begun to show. The Hawaii 
Senate recently became the first state legislative body to ban legislative prayer.287 
According to Brett Harvey and Joel Oster, “seventeen federal lawsuits have 
challenged the validity of various legislative prayer practices” between 2004 and 
2013.288 Clearly, a significant number of people are not satisfied with the legislative 
prayer status quo, and the rise of the Nones suggests that number is growing. 
After the inevitable fall of legislative prayer, what standard will rise to take its 
place? It would be unnecessary for the Court to craft a new rule. It could simply 
overrule Marsh and Galloway and revive the Lemon/endorsement test as the 
prevailing standard in legislative prayer cases. As Justice Brennan noted in Marsh, 
any legislative prayer policy must flunk the Lemon test.289 Legislative prayer does 
not have a primarily secular purpose, its primary effect is to advance and endorse 
religion, and it fosters an excessive entanglement with religion.290 
If government entities are determined to begin legislative sessions with a ceremony 
that serves “the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, 
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy 
of appreciation in society,”291 there are several ways they may do so without using 
prayer. As Justice Kennedy rightly noted in Allegheny, “appeals to patriotism, 
moments of silence, and any number of other approaches would be as effective.”292 
Appeals to patriotism may be the closest substitute for legislative prayer. A 
legislative body could read from the writings of the Founding Fathers, the 
Declaration of Independence, or any number of presidential speeches throughout 
history. In fact, two months after the Galloway decision, a man named Dan 
Courtney delivered the first atheist invocation before a Greece town board 
meeting.293 Mr. Courtney “quoted the Declaration of Independence and called upon 
common principals [sic] that unite all Americans.”294 Such invocations, if delivered 
at every meeting, would provide all the secular and civic benefits of legislative 
prayer with none of the controversy or religiously based divisiveness. 
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Alternatively, Professor Eric J. Segall has advocated using moments of 
silence.295 This would provide an opportunity for prayer, but those who do not wish 
to take part would not be “compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts of 
others.”296 Moments of silence would certainly eliminate the problems associated 
with spoken legislative prayers, but they would not provide the same civic benefits 
as appeals to patriotism. 
Finally, a government entity could establish a public forum in which citizens 
would be completely free to express their religious views, as the town claimed that it 
did in Galloway.297 However, this would require the government to “give up virtually 
all control over the resulting speech. . . . It will have to allow entirely secular 
invocations. It will have to allow speeches that question the appropriateness of 
legislative prayer, and speeches that reject prayer altogether.”298 Thus, a legislative 
body would more likely choose patriotic ceremonies or moments of silence. 
Other secular, constitutional alternatives could undoubtedly be imagined. As the 
preceding discussion demonstrates, the secular purposes served by legislative prayer 
never required an actual prayer. The practice was never justified by necessity or any 
legitimate constitutional principle; its only justification was the questionable 
historical tradition relied upon by the Supreme Court in Marsh and Galloway. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative prayer was unconstitutional when the First Congress implemented 
the practice, when Marsh affirmed it in 1983, and when Galloway reaffirmed it in 
2014. Its continued existence has provided no public benefit that could not have 
been obtained through secular means, and it has created religious strife, 
divisiveness, and controversy, leading to litigation in Galloway and many other 
cases. The institutional pressures on the Court dictated that legislative prayer could 
not be struck down in Galloway or in the immediate future. But eventually, assuming 
the Nones continue to grow and America continues its slow shift from the religious to 
the secular, legislative prayer will likely be abolished. Until that day arrives, we can 
expect only additional controversy and further litigation in this area of the law. 
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